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__________ 
 
JOHN SARANCHUK; JAMIE SARANCHUK; JOHN R. MACIOLEK; TAMMY 
MACIOLEK; JASON KWIATKOWSKI; AMY KWIATKOWSKI;  
CHARLES YARICK, 
Appellants 
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DAN LELLO, individually in his personal capacity and as Mayor of the Borough of 
Dupont; STANLEY KNICK, Jr., individually in his personal capacity and as President of 
the Council of the Borough of Dupont; MARK KOWALCZYK, individually in his 
personal capacity, as Vice Chairperson of the Council of Dupont Borough and as head of 
the Police Commission; JOSEPHINE HANSEN, individually in her personal capacity 
and as a member of the Police Commission and Council of the Borough of Dupont; 
BERNARD ZIELINSKI, individually in his personal capacity and as a member of the 
Council of Dupont Borough; SEAN MURRAY, individually in his personal capacity and 
as Chief of Police of the Borough of Dupont; BOROUGH OF DUPONT, Luzerne 
County, Pennsylvania 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3-15-cv-00893) 
District Judge: Hon. Malachy E. Mannion 
__________ 
 
Argued June 11, 2019 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges. 
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Andrew J. Katsock, III  [ARGUED] 
15 Sunrise Drive 
Wilkes-Barre, PA 18705 
 
 Attorney for Appellants 
 
 
David J. MacMain  [ARGUED] 
Laurie A. Fiore 
MACMAIN LAW GROUP LLC 
433 West Market Street, Suite 200 
West Chester, PA 19382 
 
 Attorneys for Appellees 
 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________
 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants are four police officers who worked for the Borough of Dupont, 
Pennsylvania. They contend that, because they were members of the local police union, 
the Borough either terminated their employments or severely cut their hours. And this 
retaliation, they say, violated their property interests under the union’s collective 
bargaining agreement with the Borough and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The District Court held that the Borough did not violate the officers’ 
procedural due process rights because the officers did not have constitutionally protected 
property interests in their continued employment. We disagree. We will affirm in part, 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent.  
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reverse in part, and vacate in part the District Court’s decision and remand for further 
consideration.  
I1 
John Saranchuk, John Maciolek, Jason Kwiatkowski, and Charles Yarick were 
police officers with the Borough of Dupont, Pennsylvania. Each of them was a member 
or officer of the Dupont Borough Police Officers’ Association (“Union”). The Union 
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the Borough that was 
effective from January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2016.  
The Borough paid the officers by the hour and did not guarantee the officers any 
number of work hours per week. None of the officers had employment contracts with the 
Borough. Instead, their shifts were determined on a month-to-month basis by the Officer 
in Charge, who, from early 2011 to August 2014, was Saranchuk. In general, the Officer 
in Charge had absolute discretion to set the monthly schedule, prorating hours among 
officers roughly by availability, seniority, and competency.  
In August 2014, the Borough appointed Sean Murray to be the new Officer in 
Charge of the Borough police department, replacing Saranchuk. Saranchuk was told not 
to come back to work until further notice. A few days later, Saranchuk received notice 
from the Borough Council to attend a “meeting … regarding a Luzerne County District 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise de novo review over the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment, “viewing the facts in a light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party, and applying the same standard that guides our district courts.” 
Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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Attorney’s detective investigation.” Supp. App. 251. That meeting—which the Borough 
called a “Loudermill hearing”—was rescheduled twice. Supp. App. 250–52. When 
Saranchuk finally met with the Borough, he was told that the hearing had to be 
rescheduled yet again and that he would be provided with written accusations against 
him. He alleges that his employment was terminated shortly after that, without a hearing, 
because of his association with the Union. The Borough contends that Saranchuk was 
terminated for misconduct.  
The other officers allege that the Borough similarly retaliated against them. 
Maciolek asserts that his hours were cut within a few weeks of Murray’s appointment and 
that he was terminated shortly thereafter. Kwiatkowski says that his hours were reduced 
significantly, starting around October 2014, until he was “[e]ffectively” terminated in 
May 2015. Supp. App. 527. And Yarick contends that his hours were repeatedly cut by 
the Borough and eventually reduced to zero in early 2016. For its part, the Borough says 
that Maciolek and Kwiatkowski were not actually terminated; they were simply not 
scheduled for shifts because they were unresponsive or incompetent.  
The officers sued the Borough, the Borough Council’s members, the Borough’s 
mayor, and Sean Murray in May 2015, asserting a dozen claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and state 
common law.2 In particular, the officers alleged that the Borough violated their 
procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by terminating their 
                                              
2 We refer to the various defendants-appellees collectively as simply the 
“Borough.” 
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employments or significantly cutting their hours with no associated process. After some 
discovery, the Borough moved for summary judgment. 
Ultimately, the District Court rejected all the officers’ claims. As relevant here, the 
District Court found that the Borough did not violate the officers’ procedural due process 
rights because, under the CBA, the officers had no constitutionally protected property 
interest in their continued employments. And, given that lack of a property interest, the 
Court declined to “undertake an inquiry into the adequacy of the procedures that were 
provided to the plaintiffs.” App. 22. The officers3 timely appealed.4 
II 
Our procedural due process analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we determine 
whether the officers had a constitutionally protected property interest in their continued 
employment. See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 177 (3d Cir. 2007). If the answer is 
yes, “we then must decide what procedures constitute ‘due process of law’” and whether 
                                              
3 The notice of appeal also names three of the officers’ spouses as Appellants. 
App. 1. But the spouses do not challenge the District Court’s decisions on any of their 
state-law claims. And the spouses have never asserted that they have constitutionally 
protected property interests at issue here or that the Borough violated their due process 
rights. So even though the spouses are putative appellants, they have no claims at issue in 
this appeal. 
4 The officers purported to appeal the District Court’s decision only as it related to 
four of their twelve claims. At oral argument, the officers’ counsel conceded that they 
contest the District Court’s judgment only on their procedural due process and Monell 
claims. So we address only those claims in this opinion. (The officers’ other two claims 
are meritless anyway. Their substantive due process claim fails for lack of a fundamental, 
constitutionally protected property interest. See Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 
133, 139–41 (3d Cir. 2000). And their civil rights conspiracy claim fails because they 
cannot show any evidence of “invidious” discrimination. See Farber v. City of Patterson, 
440 F.3d 131, 134, 143 (3d Cir. 2006).) 
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the officers received such procedures. Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 
(3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Employees like the officers do not automatically have protected property interests 
in their jobs. That is, they “must have a legitimate entitlement to [their] continued 
employment,” and not merely a “unilateral expectation.” Wilson, 475 F.3d at 177 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Whether the officers had such an 
entitlement turns on state law—here, Pennsylvania. See Kelly v. Borough of Sayreville, 
107 F.3d 1073, 1077 (3d Cir. 1997) (“State law creates the property rights protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”). And because the officers disclaimed at oral argument any 
reliance on Pennsylvania statutes,5 their only resort is to the CBA. See Pipkin v. Pa. State 
Police, 693 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. 1997) (“A governmental employee only has a personal or 
property right in his employment where he can establish a legitimate expectation of 
continued employment through either a contract or a statute.”). 
Article 19, Section 1 of the CBA provides: 
No full-time Police Officer or regular part-time Police Officer 
covered by this Agreement shall be discharged, suspended or 
demoted, or otherwise disciplined, except for just cause, and 
                                              
5 The officers asserted in supplemental briefing that they also had constitutionally 
protected property rights to their continued employments under the Pennsylvania 
Borough Code and the Police Tenure Act. Appellant’s Supp. Letter Br. 2–3 (citing 53 Pa. 
Stat. §§ 811, 812; 8 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1101). They expressly waived this contention at oral 
argument, so we take no position on it here. We note, however, that whether the officers 
would otherwise count as members of a “police force,” or whether they would be 
excepted from that definition because they are “[e]xtra police serving from time or time 
or on an hourly or daily basis,” 8 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1170(4), is an open question. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted a petition for certification on this issue in 
DeForte v. Borough of Worthington, 189 A.3d 390 (Pa. 2018) (table). 
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the Borough shall state the reason for just cause, in writing, at 
the same time such action is taken. 
 
Supp. App. 778. Under our precedent, this provision creates a constitutionally protected 
property interest in the officers’ continued employments. Wilson, 475 F.3d at 177 (“In the 
governmental context, …  employment contracts that contain a ‘just cause’ provision 
create a property interest in continued employment.” (citing Kelly, 107 F.3d at 1077) 
(other citation omitted)); Dee, 549 F.3d at 231; Unger v. Nat’l Residents Matching 
Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that a constitutionally 
protected “property interest arises where the contract itself includes a provision that the 
state entity can terminate the contract only for cause”). Put simply, the CBA guaranteed 
that the Borough could not “discharge[], suspend[] or demote[], or otherwise discipline[]” 
the officers without “just cause.” Supp. App. 778. That guarantee is sufficient to confer a 
constitutionally protected property interest. 
Yet the contours of that interest are hazy. The Borough regularly emphasized to 
the officers that they were not guaranteed any hours of work. And the CBA nowhere 
guarantees hours either. So although the officers had an interest not to be “discharged, 
suspended or demoted, or otherwise disciplined” without “just cause,” it is unclear 
whether a reduction in not-guaranteed hours would impinge on that interest. 
On remand, the District Court should take three steps. First, it should determine 
whether, in view of the officers’ variable month-to-month schedules, the officers’ 
reduction in hours was a form of “discipline,” or was dramatic enough to constitute a 
“demotion,” “suspension,” or constructive “discharge.” Supp. App. 778; see Ferraro v. 
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City of Long Branch, 23 F.3d 803, 806–07 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that “constructive 
discharge” may constitute a deprivation of a protected property interest). If so, the Court 
should next decide whether “extraordinary circumstances” rendered pre-deprivation 
process infeasible. Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 2011); see Dee, 549 
F.3d at 233. And lastly, if an officer suffered only “discipline” or “demotion” under the 
CBA, the Court should decide whether these adverse actions even trigger the Due Process 
Clause’s protections as a matter of federal constitutional law. See Town of Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005); see also, e.g., Perez v. Cucci, 725 F. Supp. 209, 243 
(D.N.J. 1989) (finding property interest in not being demoted), aff’d mem., 898 F.2d 142 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
The Borough contends that “[n]o [p]rotections [a]ttach to [the officers] [u]nder 
Article 19, Section 1” because the officers “waived their right[s] to proceed” under that 
section by failing to complete the formal grievance process under the CBA.6 Appellees’ 
Supp. Letter Br. 9–10. Put differently, the Borough thinks that because the officers did 
not seek to validate their interests through arbitration under the CBA, they never had any 
protected property interests in the first place. But this conflates the two parts of our 
procedural due process analysis. First we examine whether a property interest exists; only 
after answering that question do we turn to whether grievance procedures (if any) were 
adequate or availed. Dee, 549 F.3d at 229. Our answer at the first step is not contingent 
                                              
6 Article 19, Section 2 provides that “whether ‘JUST CAUSE’ exists” under 
Section 1 “shall be subject to the grievance/arbitration procedure” in Article 17. Supp. 
App. 778. 
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on whether, at the second step, the plaintiffs adequately pursued available procedures. In 
short, whether the officers arbitrated their claims says nothing about whether the officers 
had a property interest entitling them to pre-deprivation process. 
The Borough’s waiver argument is incorrect anyway. The grievance procedure 
under the CBA is designed to sort out “whether ‘JUST CAUSE’ exist[ed]” for the 
Borough to take adverse employment action against an officer only after the fact. Supp. 
App. 777–78. Yet, “absent extraordinary circumstances, due process requires notice and a 
hearing prior to suspension without pay, even where union grievance procedures, after 
the fact, fully compensate erroneously suspended employees.” Schmidt, 639 F.3d at 597; 
see Dee, 549 F.3d at 233 (“Only in extraordinary situations where some valid 
government interest is at stake is it permissible to postpone the hearing until after the 
deprivation has already occurred.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
Ordinarily, our next steps would be to determine whether the Borough in fact 
infringed on the officers’ protected interests, and, if so, whether the officers received 
sufficient pre-deprivation process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Dee, 549 
F.3d at 232–33; Wilson, 475 F.3d at 178–79. But because the District Court stopped at 
step one, and given the remaining factual disputes in the record, we decline to take these 
next steps here. See Dee, 549 F.3d at 233. Instead, we will simply reverse the District 
Court’s initial determination that the officers lacked a constitutionally protected property 
interest under the CBA and remand for consideration of the remaining Procedural Due 
Process analysis consistent with this opinion.  
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To be clear, we take no position on whether the officers other than Saranchuk 
were in fact “discharged, suspended or demoted, or otherwise disciplined” under Article 
19. Supp. App. 778. Nor do we express an opinion on whether, assuming the officers’ 
property interests were derogated, the Borough afforded the officers sufficient due 
process. The District Court is better suited to answer these questions in the first instance 
on remand. And any conclusions by the fact-finder will inform the District Court’s legal 
determination of what process each officer may have been due. See Midnight Sessions, 
Ltd. v. City of Phila., 945 F.2d 667, 682–84 (3d Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds 
by United Artists Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400–01 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
Finally, because the officers’ Monell claim may rise or fall with their procedural 
due process claim under § 1983, we take no position on it here. We will vacate the 
District Court’s decision on that claim and remand it as well.  
*   *   *   *   * 
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s decision on the officers’ 
substantive due process and conspiracy claims. We will reverse the District Court’s initial 
determination that the officers had no constitutionally protected property interest under 
the CBA. And we will vacate the District Court’s decision on the officers’ Monell claim. 
We will remand the officers’ procedural due process and Monell claims to the District 
Court for further consideration consistent with this opinion. 
